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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ryan Lee Johnson appeals from his conviction and sentence for domestic
battery with traumatic injury in the presence of a child.

Specifically, Johnson

challenges the denial of his requested unanimity instruction and he asserts the
district court abused its sentencing discretion.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Johnson with two separate counts of domestic battery
with traumatic injury in the presence of a child and one count of attempted
strangulation for instances occurring with his ex-wife and the mother of his two
children, Melissa Johnson. (R., pp.27-28.) Before trial, Johnson requested a
unanimity instruction for Count I, the domestic battery with traumatic injury in the
presence of a child occurring on October 5, 2011. The information as it regards
Count I reads as follows:
That the Defendant, RYAN LEE JOHNSON, on or about the
5 day of October, 2011, in the County of Ada, State of Idaho, did
willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon the person of
Melissa Johnson by restraining her, throwing her down, slapping
her in the face, hitting her on the head, and/or by throwing her into
a bathtub, while in the presence of C.J. (D.O.B.
, and
by committing said battery did inflict a traumatic injury upon the
person of Melissa Johnson, to-wit: bruising to her arms and/or
chest and/or a sprain to her right thumb, where Melissa Johnson
and the Defendant are household members.
th

(R., p.28.) Johnson requested a unanimity instruction based upon his contention
that the information "allege[d] several different acts and each one could
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constitute a separate crime." (2/09/12 Tr., p.4, Ls.18-20.) The trial court denied
the request, holding:
They are separate acts. But when you have a series of - especially
in a domestic battery where the allegations are a beating that
occurs over a period from one room to the other, to require the
state to prove that the beating - the hitting that occurred in the
bathroom is the one that caused the traumatic injury or the hitting
that occurred in the living room is what caused the traumatic injury
is simply not what the law requires. So I'm denying the request.
(2/09/12 Tr., p13, L.17-p.14, L.1.)
The case proceeded to trial with Johnson, the victim, and their child in
common all testifying as to their individual recollection of the events at issue.
(See generally 2/13/12 Tr., pp.251-265 (testimony of Melissa); 2/14/12 Tr., p.406,
L.16 - p.423, L.21 (Johnson's testimony), p.482, L20 - p.496, L.1 (C.J.'s
testimony).) The jury returned a verdict of guilty to Count I, not guilty on Count II
(attempted strangulation), and guilty on a lesser included charge of domestic
battery on Count Ill. (R., pp.12-14.)
The court sentenced Johnson to three years fixed followed by 12 years
indeterminate on Count I and a concurrent six-month jail sentence on Count Ill.
(R., pp.140-144; Tr., p.532, L.25 - p.533, L.18.) Johnson timely appeals. (R.,
pp.150-153.)
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ISSUES

Johnson states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Johnson's request for
a unanimity instruction?
2.
Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an
excessive sentence in light of the mitigating factors that exist in this
case?
'
(Appellant's brief, p. 9.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Johnson failed to show that the district court erred when it did not give
a unanimity instruction on Count I?
2.
Has Johnson failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing
discretion?
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ARGUMENT

I.
Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Did Not Give
A Unanimity Instruction On Count I

A

Introduction
Johnson asserts that the district court erred when it did not give a

unanimity instruction on Count I, domestic battery with traumatic injury occurring
in the presence of a child, occurring on October 5, 2011. (Appellant's brief, pp.
15-17.) His assertion, however, is baseless because Johnson cannot show from
the record that the state presented evidence of multiple separate and distinct
acts that could have, by themselves, been the basis of conviction instead of the
one criminal count charged by the state.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the

appellate court exercises free review. Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 265, 16
P.3d 937, 941 (Ct. App. 2000). To be reversible error, any error in the jury
instructions must have misled the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State
v. Row, 131 Idaho 303, 310, 955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998).

C.

Johnson Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Did
Not Give An Unanimity Instruction
In Idaho, a criminal defendant may be convicted only when a unanimous

jury concludes that the criminal act charged has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt. Idaho Const., art. I, § 7. Ordinarily, an instruction informing
the jury that its "verdict must be unanimous" will suffice to protect the defendant's
4

right to jury unanimity. State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 19, 981 P.2d 738, 744
(1999). It is only when the state presents evidence of multiple separate and
distinct acts, any of which could by themselves form the basis of the count
charged, that "jury unanimity must be protected by prosecutorial election of a
single act upon which it will rely for conviction or by a clarifying instruction
requiring the jurors to agree that the same underlying criminal act has been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 268, 16 P.3d
937, 944 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing State v. Petrich, 683 P.2d 173, 178 (Wash.
1984)); see also State v. Montoya, 140 Idaho 160, 167-68, 90 P.3d 910, 917-18
(Ct. App. 2004).
As the district court addressed when denying the request for the unanimity
instruction, this was "a beating that occur[ed] over a period from one room to the
other." (2/09/12 Tr., p.13, Ls.19-20.)

Melissa testified an argument over her

son's cell phone escalated into physical contact, with Johnson coming into
Melissa's bedroom, yelling at her, then following her into her bathroom where he
pushed her into the bathtub and threw her around. (2/13/12 Tr., p.252, L.9 p.255, L.9.) Johnson stopped beating Melissa and went to the dining room, only
to come back to her bedroom where Johnson pushed Melissa down and forcibly
pinned her arms behind her head.

(2/13/12 Tr., p.255, L.10 - p.257, L.7.)

Melissa was able to get loose and "grabbed him in his private area." (2/13/12 Tr.,
p.257, Ls.9-10.) Johnson then slapped Melissa in the face and left her bedroom,
taking Melissa's phone, and went into the living room. (2/13/12 Tr., p.258, L.12p.259, L.19.) Melissa followed Johnson into the living room to get her phone
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back from him and Johnson pushed Melissa to the floor on her stomach while
holding her hands behind her back. (2/13/12 Tr., p.258, L.20 - p.260, L.8.)
This description of events is contrary to Johnson's claim on appeal that
"each of these events was divided by discernible intervening time periods."
(Appellant's brief, p.14.)

The evidence instead showed one ongoing beating

where Melissa and Johnson were going from room to room, with one following
the other without any discernible intervening time periods. Johnson's testimony
at trial was consistent with this being an ongoing altercation.

Although he

testified his actions were in self-defense, his own testimony of moving throughout
the house did not include intervening time periods.

Johnson testified that,

following the verbal and physical exchange in the bathroom, Johnson testified he
was "about halfway through the dining room and Melissa was coming at [him]
from behind telling [him] that [he] needed to give her this phone back." (2/14/12
Tr., p.412, Ls.13-16.) Johnson testified about a physical interaction with Melissa
as the aggressor then taking place in the dining room, upon the conclusion of
which he went into the living room and sat on the couch.

(2/14/12 Tr., p.412,

L.23 - p.415, L.4.) Melissa then came into the living room where Johnson and
their child, C.J., were seated on the couch and another physical interaction
occurred between him and Melissa after which Melissa and C.J. left the home.
(2/14/12 Tr., p.415, L.2 -

p.423, L.21.)

Although Johnson's testimony

characterized Melissa as the aggressor and he as the victim, his version of when
and where the altercation took place was consistent with Melissa's.
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C.J. also testified that he was sitting on the couch in the living room while
his mom and dad were fighting in his mom's bedroom, kitchen and then the living
room. (2/14/12 Tr., p.484, L.15 - p.490, L.2.) The record belies Johnson's claim
that the domestic battery as charged in Count I included "separate, distinct,
alleged batteries, with discernible time periods in between." (Appellant's brief,
p.16.)

Instead, the evidence shows this was an ongoing altercation where

Johnson and Melissa followed one another throughout the house, room to room,
with no discernible breaks in the altercation. This was a fight over a cell phone
that continued throughout the house until Melissa and C.J. left.
Because the trial testimony makes it clear that the beating Melissa
suffered at the hands of Johnson was in fact all part of a continuing course of
conduct with no discernible intervening time periods breaking up the acts of
violence, Johnson has failed to establish error based on the lack of a unanimity
instruction and his assertion of error must fail.
Even assuming that the incidents of physical contact testified to by
Johnson, Melissa and C.J. constituted separate and distinct acts warranting a
special unanimity instruction, the lack of such an instruction was harmless and
does not necessitate reversal of Johnson's conviction.

Montoya, 140 Idaho at

168, 90 P.3d at 918 (applying harmless error analysis where trial court failed to
give unanimity instruction); Miller, 135 Idaho at 268-69, 16 P.3d at 944-45
(same).
In Miller, the Idaho Court of Appeals recognized that even if a district court
errs by not giving a special unanimity instruction, such error will be deemed
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harmless so long as the reviewing court is able to declare, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the jury would have reached the same result even if the instruction
had been given.

Miller, 135 Idaho at 268-69, 16 P.3d at 944-45.

Miller was

charged with two counts of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen. At trial, the
victim testified as to six separate instances of sexual misconduct, any of which
could have formed the basis for conviction under the charged counts. Although
the court of appeals agreed with Miller that, under such circumstances, the
district court was required to have sua sponte given a unanimity instruction, it
ultimately found the trial error to be harmless. In reaching its determination, the
court noted that the case turned upon the victim's testimony, which, the court
noted, the "jury obviously found ... credible, as Miller was found guilty on both
counts of the indictment."

il!:. at 268,

16 P.3d at 944.

Applying the reasoning of Miller to the facts of this case, it is clear that any
error in lack of a special unanimity instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable
doubt. As discussed above, Johnson testified fairly consistently with Melissa in
terms of acts of violence in different parts of the house. Although he admitted the
acts occurred, he claimed his actions were in self-defense. Thus, as in Miller, the
only issue the jury had to decide was who was more credible, Melissa or
Johnson.

As in Miller, the jury obviously found Melissa's testimony more

credible, as it found Johnson guilty of this offense as well as the lesser included
offense in County Ill. Under the circumstances of this case, there is no rational
basis by which the jury could have found that Johnson was the aggressor as to
some of the acts of physical violence but not as to others.
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Having rejected

Johnson's self-defense claim, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury
would have reached the same result even had a unanimity instruction been
given. Thus, as in Miller, the lack of a unanimity instruction is harmless because
it is clear, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury would have convicted
Johnson even had such an instruction been given. Johnson has failed to show
any basis for reversal of his conviction.

11.
Johnson Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Sentencing Court's
Discretion

A.

Introduction
Johnson concedes that "his sentence is within the statutory maximum"

(Appellant's brief, p.18, n.7), but argues the district court "abused its discretion by
failing to use due caution in concluding that Mr. Johnson attempted to strangle
Ms. Johnson [where he was acquitted of attempted strangulation], and by failing
to adequately consider the mitigating factors that exist in this case." (Appellant's
brief, p.18.) Johnson has failed to meet his burden and has thereby failed to
establish that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a 15-year unified
sentence with the first three years fixed upon a jury finding of guilt to domestic
battery with traumatic injury in the presence of a child.

B.

Standard Of Review
When a defendant alleges an excessive sentence on appeal, the appellate

court independently reviews "all of the facts and circumstances of the case" and
considers the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. State v.
9

Cope, 142 Idaho 492, 500, 129 P.3d 1241, 1249 (2006). To prevail, the
appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the facts, the
sentence is excessive considering the objectives of criminal punishment. Cope,
142 Idaho at 500, 129 P.3d at 1249. Those objectives are "(1) protection of
society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing."
State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104 P.3d 969, 975 (2005). The fixed portion
of the sentence is considered the probable duration of confinement.

State v.

Sanchez, 115 Idaho 776,777,769 P.2d 1148, 1149 (Ct. App. 1989). A sentence
that does not exceed the statutory maximum will not be disturbed on appeal
absent a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772, 653
P.2d 1183, 1184 (Ct. App. 1982). Where reasonable minds might differ as to the
length of sentence, the appellate court will not substitute its view for that of the
sentencing court. State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 393, 825 P.2d 482, 490
(1992).

C.

Johnson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its
Discretion
Johnson asserts his sentence was excessive when viewed in light of all of

the circumstances. (Appellant's brief, p.18.) Johnson contends on appeal that
the sentencing court improperly focused on the unproven allegation of attempted
strangulation in imposing Johnson's sentence. (Appellant's brief, pp.21-22.) The
court discussed the "problems" juries seem to have with the elements of
attempted strangulation (4/14/12 Tr., p.527, L.13 - p.529, L.7), but contrary to
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Johnson's claim, it did not focus on the "attempted strangulation allegation and
prior uncharged and unproven allegations of strangulation" (Appellant's brief,
p.21) in imposing sentence.

Although concerned about the information

presented at sentencing of a prior uncharged victim who suffered "remarkably
similar" violence at Johnson's hands, the court considered both the evidence of
mitigation presented by Johnson as well as the aggravating circumstances in
determining it was time for Johnson to "take responsibility for [his] own actions."
(4/14/12 Tr., p.528, Ls.3-17.)
Johnson asked the court at sentencing to retain jurisdiction in his case
because he "accept[ed] responsibility for the role he played in the confrontation
and [he exhibited a] willingness to participate in treatment." (Appellant's brief,
pp.19-20 (citations omitted).) On appeal Johnson cites to the "appalling horror"
of violence he observed as a child, the time he spent in foster care, and his drug
and alcohol addictions as part of the mitigation the court should have considered
in sentencing. (Appellant's brief, pp.20-21.)
The district court addressed the mitigation presented on Johnson's behalf:
The other thing I want
there's an argument that you
here's my suggestion to you.
would not batter the mother of
them.

to say is that you - there's an love your children. Well, here If you love your children, then you
those children especially in front of

Now, there was some suggestion in your statement to the
court that the reason that you have this affinity for assaulting your
intimate partners is because of what happened to you as a child.
The fact of the matter is the data do not support that. People who
observe domestic violence are just as likely to avoid domestic
violence as they are to commit it. So the data do not support the
concept that because you saw it as a child you are now a batterer.
That's a misconception in our society.
11

(4/14/12 Tr., p.530, l.24- p.531, L.15.) The court was concerned with the impact
of Johnson's behavior on his own children:
But the one thing that we do know is we have found that
there are differences in brain activity for children who have
observed this kind of behavior on the part of their parents. It affects
children very distinctly. So your children have been affected by
this.
(4/14/12 Tr., p.531, Ls.16-21.)
The court took note of Johnson's failure to take advantage of prior
opportunities to rehabilitate, including drug court:
In addition I will point out that you have had significant
resources, as the prosecutor pointed out; drug court twice; you had
a retained jurisdiction. And given what I see here, I do not think
another retained jurisdiction is appropriate.
(4/14/12 Tr., p.531, L.22 - p.532, l.2.)

The court was also concerned with

Johnson's continued claims of self-defense and his ongoing claim that part of his
violence against Melissa "was righteous" (Tr., p.529, Ls.13-24) and concluded
that Johnson was "in need of correctional treatment, and that a lesser sentence
would depreciate the seriousness of this crime" (Tr., p.530, Ls.9-11).
Johnson has failed to show that the sentence of three years fixed followed
by 12 years indeterminate is excessive considering the seriousness of his
offense and the impact upon his victims when viewed with Johnson's many
previous failed attempts at treatment and rehabilitation and his continued failure
to take complete responsibility for his actions.
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CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to uphold Johnson's judgment of
conviction and sentence.

Dated this 29 th day of Janua
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